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Where Do We Go From Here?
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price, but that may also mean less
profit to producers. This is so
because the domestic food market
will consume a b o u t the same
amount of wheat regardless of
price, although there would be
some increase in sales of wheat for
feed and possibly for industrial and
export uses.
We should distinguish between
"reserve" and "surplus" and work
toward eliminating the surplus.
Let's look at some of the proposals to help "solve" the problem.
We've grouped them into supply,
use, and marketing alternatives. In
addition to describing how the
alternatives may work suggestions
have been made as to their probable consequences.
We have not listed all th e possible alternatives. You may sugges t
other approaches.
No alternative should be considered by itself. Probably the "best"
solution will include several parts
of one or more of the alternatives.
Before going into alternatives we
n eed answers to questions · like
these:
What really is the problem?
Whom does it affect? How does
it affect them? Does it affect them
all alike? Why or why not?
What are the objectives or the
goals being sought?
Do~s the solution take . into account all causes of the problem, or
does it treat only the sympto~s?
Does the solution create other
problems?
Are the solutions feasible-economically and politically?

In earlier publications in this series we looked at wheat as a crop
and at its importance to the Great Plains and her people.
We looked at the production and uses of wheat and the fact that
we've grown more than we've used. We have a wheat problem. But the
problem is not limited to the Plains nor even to the United States.
It's a world problem. Worldwide, we either produce too much or use too
little wheat. We reviewed the role of supply and demand and their effect
on prices. We studied the marketing system and the place of governmental
policy and foreign trade in wheat.
The history of wheat is interesting. But it's not just the past that
interests us now. What really counts is the future.
What is that future? How do we
wheat marketing system. There can
discover it?
be various degrees of governmental
We don't! We decide-not discontrols, or no programs at all.
cover-the future by the choices we
\ t\Te have m any choices.
make now and continue to make
Any decision will have an impact
in the years ahead!
upon the Plains and her people.
We've studied the past, and had
·w heat has been more than just
an opportunity to study its sueanother crop-it has been the life
blood of the Plains. When we look
cesses and mistakes. \ t\Th ere do we
go from here?
at the choices, remember that they
Some people say, "regrassing the
are choices which will affect not
Plains is the solution." Admittedly,
only a crop, but also a region, and
some wheat land in the Plains is
its people.
"marginal" and could well be reWe are looking for-and hoping
grassed; but widespread regrassing
th at there exists-a course of action
of the Plains is hardly feasiblewhich will result in the best use of
either economically or in terms of
resources in the Plains for the peapublic policy.
ple of the Plains and for the naSome people say, "let's return to
tion al welfare.
'free markets'." This would mean
removal of all production and marBEHIND THE CHOICES
keting controls and price supports.
Farmers could plant as much as
The wheat-producing n a t i o n s
they wanted and would take their
of the world have the capacity to
chances in the market.
grow more wheat than has been
These are the most extreme soluused. The need is to find new uses
tions. In between are a great many
for the resources that have contripossibilities. A variety of ways may
buted to over-production or to
be used to adjust production . W e
expand outlets for wheat.
can try to increase use of wheat. W e
One possibility of increasing
wheat us age involves lowering
can make improvements in the
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SUPPLY ALTERNATIVES
We can affect the market supply
of wheat by storage policy, income
transfers, input andj or marketing
restrictions, and by eliminating
government programs. Let's examine these alternatives.

Storage
Wheat storage policy is determined by the answers to:
"Bow much shall be stored?"
"By whom?''
"Where?"
In the past, storage policy has
been governed largely by price support policy. More recently the desirable amount of wheat in storage
has come under considerable discussion.
Since we are not now using our
full capacity to grow wheat, and,
since many people consider carryover to be in excess of "reserve"
needs, it is unlikely that developing storage policy will f a v o r
increased storage stocks.
To increase stocks-or even to
continue p r e s e n t levels-storage
means a higher or continued cost
to the public. The producer and
the grain handler both want maximum returns from use of their resources. The taxpayer wants relief
from high government costs. There
are conflicts in these goals.
How much wheat is a reasonable
amount to have in reserve?
Should there be different reserves
for each class of wheat? How does
this compare with current carryovers of the various classes?
Over how long a period would
you spread out any desired adjustments?
Who provides the storage depends in part upon whether the
stocks should be held in production
areas or in areas of consumption.
If the government stores wheat, it
must own storage facilities or rent
space from commercial interests.
Recent action to reduce surplus
has idled large amounts of storage
facilities. It is estimated that private storage capacity exceeds requirements by 20 percent or more.
Since government policy has been
to hold most CCC stocks in private
storage, a policy of reduced carry-

over has put some firms under
severe pressure.
The question of "how much"
may determine how many storage
firms can remain in business in the
Great Plains and elsewhere. For a
particular firm the "who" and
"where" of government storage may
mean life or death.
Increases or decreases in storage
stocks may temporarily relieve or
aggravate market problems. In
either case long run problems of
producers are not solved by storage
policy alone.
Who should store the wheat reserve? Producers? Handlers? The
Government?
Should government pay the storage costs? If not, who?
Where should wheat be storedwhere it's grown or where it's to
be used?
Decisions on storage have implications for other supply and use
alternatives, since storage must be
considered as a part of the total
supply available.

Income Transfers
In some countries the government pays producers the difference
between the "support price" and
market price. There are other ways
to link income transfers to production, price, or income guarantees.
Not all income transfers need be
paid by the public treasury. For
instance, a system of multiple prices
would pass costs on to the consumer
through the market.
Until the surplus problem is
solved, high wheat price supports
without some form of effective production control are unlikely. High
price supports and the subsequent
storage have become too costly to
be politically acceptable without
effective controls.
Support rates determine the cost
of grain acquired by government;
they cause more grain to be diverted to storage. More grain in
storage increases CCC costs for
storage and administration of the
storage program. Market prices
must go up to attract wheat to
commercial channels, b r i n g i n g
about a rise in consumer prices.
We haven't had much experience
with low price supports. Low sup-
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ports could serve as a "floor." Unless the supply decreased radically,
market prices wou~d likely drop
close to the "floor" support price,
the price of feed grains, or the
world wheat price-whichever were
higher.
Do you think price supports or
some form of subsidy for wheat is
necessary?
From what you know about supply-demand relationships, how
high do you think wheat price sup·
ports should be?
What effect would lower wheat
price supports have on wheat producers, on the Great Plains economy in general?

Input Restrictions
"Input" is any production item
-credit, fertilizer, labor, land, machines, management, s e e d, etc.
Input restrictions can take the form
of discouraging, prohibiting, rationing or taxing the use of productive items.
To the extent one input can be
substituted for another, input restrictions are not effective in controlling production.
Under acreage allotments, farmers use more fertilizer, better seed
and cultural practices to step up
yields. They follow the logical selfinterest principle of making the
best use of resources to maximize
income. Another problem is that
input restrictions may not result in
the best mixture of resources.
W'heat could be produced at a
lower cost per unit without input
restrictions.
It is possible, however, to restrict
the use of one or more inputs so
severely that it becomes impossible to compensate for the loss by
substituting other inputs. In our
society this is unlikely unless high
incentives are involved, as was the
case in land retirement.
Attempts to control production
through i n p u t restriction may
affect producers differently. A reduction in acreage in high yielding
areas would reduce total production more than a similar reduction
in areas of low yield.
Input restrictions may also have
different effects on the sellers of
the various kinds of inputs. For
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example, acreage reductions may
lead to increases in fertilizer sales
but decreases in machinery sales.
Input restrictions may be either
compulsory or voluntary. Let's take
acreage diversion (or land retirement) as an example.
Compulsory acreage diversion requires the producer to comply to
secure benefits. If he doesn't comply, he may be subject to penalties.
Voluntary diversion is in the form
of compensatory payments for taking land out of production. It may
include permission to plant nonsurplus crops. Soil-conserving practices on retired or diverted land
may be required. The same purpose-reducing productive acreage
-could even be accomplished by
government rental, outright purchase of the land, or purchase of
production rights.
Unless acreage diversion or land
retirement is made economically
attractive, farmers are not likely to
support such a program.
Land retirement or diversion programs are subject to many of the
same shortcomings as restrictions
on use of other production inputs.
Farmers tend to farm non-diverted acres more intensively.
Growers who don't take part may
increase their production. Marginal
farmers are more likely to take part
in a voluntary program than those
who farm on a larger scale or more
efficiently. Thus, production does
not decline as much proportionately as does acreage-a criticism of
the Soil Bank program.
Voluntary input restrictions are
more palatable politically to farmers than are compulsory restrictions.
When complementary programs,
such as retraining and relocation,
and resource andjor economic development, accompany input restriction programs, they are more
likely to succeed. Complementary
programs attempt to employ the
restricted or under-used resource
more productively-particularly the
human resource.
How would uncontrolled production affect wheat supply and prices?
Should any restrictions be placed
on wheat inputs? What input re-

strictions could we most effectively
use to limit production?
How foolproof would they bewould they really be effective, or
might substitution of other inputs
reduce their effectiveness?
Could i n p u t restrictions be
achieved voluntarily or would subs i d i e s-even compulsion-be required?
What are some alternative uses
of wheat inputs? Are they economically feasible? Might these other
uses cause problems in a new area?
What problems?
What complementary programs
are needed in addition to farm adjustment programs?

Marketing Restrictions
This is an indirect approach to
reducing output. Producers may be
free to produce the commodity, but
use or sale is regulated. To the
wheat grower, this usually means
bushel quotas. They may or may
not be combined with input restrictions.
If marketing restrictions were
used alone, and were known before
planting time, m o s t producers
would attempt to gear their production to the quota which they
could market. In good crop years,
farmers would store excess production as insurance against poor crop
years. Marketing restrictions would
likely increase on-farm storage and
farmers' use of bonded elevator
storage.
A multiple-price system would
require some form of marketing
quotas to assure a "fair" division
of the market by uses. Such a program would have been provided
under the "yes" vote alternative of
the 1964 wheat program.
Equitable distribution of marketing restrictions, like assigning
input restrictions, poses a problem.
Past history is the basis most often
used; but this tends to freeze production patterns and to discourage
the most efficient use of resources.
Marketing restrictions could be
made negotiable. More efficient
producers could buy marketing
rights from less efficient growers.
Once wheat marketing rights for
a certain piece of land were sold,
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that land could not be used for
wheat production.
Marketing rights could be assigned to people, rather than to
the land. These rights would revert
to the government when the holder
retired from farming for any reason. The government could then
reassign or withdraw the rights.
Such a system may not be politically attractive and could be open
to claims of favoritism. Some variations of these procedures (i.e., negotiable rights assigned to people) are
also possible.
Marketing restrictions would
also affect agriculturally-related
businesses. Grain handlers would
have reduced business which might
increase unit marketing costs. Sellers of production inputs (such as
fertilizer and machinery) would
have less business.
Historically we have been reluctant to apply either input or marketing restrictions with enough
force to cut total production or
marketing effectively over a sustained period. Either method-if
used with sufficient determination
-or a combination of the two,
could be effective in reducing wheat
output. Both would have high
costs-economically and socially.
Could marketing restrictions
without input controls effectively
regulate surpluses and the flow of
wheat to the market?
What kind would most likely be
effective? W o u l d subsidies be
needed?
Do we need to regulate both
inputs and marketing (with or
without subsidies) to control supply?
What combination would be
most effective, the most equitable
for producers, the least likely to
produce adverse effects on input
suppliers, the marketing system,
society in general?
Could marketing restrictions be
made effective without governmental controls through such
means as producer cooperatives?

No Government Wheat Program
Discussion of storage policy,
income transfers, and input andj or
marketing quotas has been primar-

ily concerned with the role of government in wheat marketing. Many
people believe that governmental
influence in crop production, marketing and storage should be limited and indirect.
Specifically, they don't want marketing quotas or input controls.
But often they don't rule out price
supports at some low, disaster-preventing level.
Let's imagine a situation in
which "the government got out of
agricultme." Research studies give
us some clues as to what might
happen under "free" prices and unlimited production.
If "the government got out of
agriculture," there'd be a substantial drop from current wheat prices.
At these lower prices we could expect lower farm incomes, lower
land prices, reduced profit for agriculturally related businesses, reduced tax bases, and increased
difficulty in financing community
services such as roads and schools.
Stocks now in government hands
would offer competition to current
production if they were thrown on
the open market. P.L. 480 could
still be used to deplete governmentheld stocks over a several year period.
Lower wheat prices could make
U.S. wheat more competitive in
the world market. Unless other
countries changed their policies of
protecting their own wheat growers, we couldn't take full advantage
of a domestic price decline.
A change in the U.S. to free
market prices, unrestricted production and world market competition
would likely produce some friction
with other major wheat exporters
and would disrupt the International Wheat Agreement.
. These "ifs" would make it
difficult for the U.S. to increase
exports as a result of lower U.S.
wheat prices.
Resource adjustment would take
place according to the relative profitability of growing wheat as compared to other crops. Wheat would
continue to be a major crop in the
Plains, since other grains and grass
are likely to be less profitable over
much of the Plains. In other areas,

more attractive alternatives may
exist.
Lower wheat prices and unrestricted wheat production would
result in conflict with feed grain
producers, if wheat replaced some
feed grains as livestock feed and
thus added to the total feed grain
supply. The wheat problem cannot
be solved in isolation.
The net short run effect of a
free market for wheat would be a
substantial drop in wheat producer's incomes. Farm consolidation
and resource recombination would
be speeded up.
Long range effects are less predictable. Production would stabilize at some new lfvel, but prices
would be lower tlian at presentunless there was a great expansion
in demand. The ending of price
support and storage programs
would result in avings to taxpayers.
l
Would you be Jftter off with a
policy of a free market and unrestricted productio:rl? Immediately?
After full adjustmept?
How would otliers-feed grain
and livestock producers, the grain
trade, people in agriculturally related businesses or communities in
the Plains-be affected by free
prices for wheat?

USE ALTERNATIVES
In Fact Sheet I we discussed the
uses of wheat: food, feed, seed,
industrial uses, and export. What
are the prospects for increasing
those uses?

Domestic Uses
Any sizable increase in any category of use would help relieve
some of the pressurb on wheat supplies and production capability.
Food Use: There has been a
downward trend in domestic per
capita consumption of wheat for
many years. Many new products
using wheat have been introduced.
Consumption subsidy plans have
been tried. But the trend persists.
A look at the past suggests that the
likelihood of increased domestic
per capita food use is small. However, new food uses developed by
research-and aggressive merchan4

dising of them-have helped the
food industry prevent more drastic declines in food uses.
Feed Use: Livestock feed use
could be expanded if the price of
wheat were allowed to fall so that
wheat could compete as a feed
grain.
Could wheat producers profitably
sell wheat at feed grain prices (at,
say, $1.00-$1.25 per bushel)?
How much wheat could be marketed as livestock feed without depressing other feed grain and livestock prices? How would feed grain
producers regard competition from
wheat?
Industrial Use: Prospects for
increased industrial uses of wheat
are slim. Very low wheat prices,
subsidies, or a unique usage would
be required before industrial use
of wheat may be expected to
increase.
During recent years industry has
developed substitutes for agricultural products more often than
agricultural products have been
adopted for use as industrial raw
materials. Many industrial uses of
agricultural products developed by
research have never been utilized
because there is often a great difference between what is technologically possible and what is economically feasible.
Seed Use: This will continue to
be minor. Only about 5 percent of
the crop is now needed for seed.

Exports
U.S. wheat exports have exceeded
600 million bushels in recent years
and may reach 900 million in
1963-64. Crop failures in Western
Europe and Russia in 1963 caused
a sharp, but temporary, increase in
export demand.
Continued sales of wheat to
Russia and her satellites in Eastern
Europe will depend upon whether
food shortages persist because of
deep-seated agricultural problems,
and upon governmental policies of
importing and exporting nations.
Some people feel we've missed
good bets for increasing our exports
even more. For example, the U.S.following its policy of not recognizing Red China, hasn't attempted
to negotiate w h e a t trade with
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China. Australia and Canada have
sold several million tons of wheat
to the Red Chinese.
What would the U.S. have lost
or gained if we had sold wheat to
China? Did the action of Canada
and Australia ease competition for
other markets?
Do the foreign policy issues
involved conflict with agricultural
trade policy? Which is more important?
Our most important cash customers for wheat have been Japan,
Italy and the United Kingdom.
The largest recipients of wheat
under our special programs have
been India, Egypt and Pakistan.
We have really been doing rather
well with wheat and flour exports
in recent years. Yet our very success in exporting wheat has brought
problems.
Less than one-third of our recent
exports have been for cash. And
even those have required a government subsidy to make up the difference between domestic and world
prices. (See Fact Sheet IV: Can We
Export More Wheat for details.)
The other two-thirds have also
moved under special programs.
At current U.S. wheat prices,
most exports have involved costs
to taxpayers. However justified
these exports may be for humanitarian or economic development
purposes, the importance of export
subsidies concerns the U.S. wheat
industry, which is dependent on
foreign trade for about half its
total market.
Setting aside the effect of PL 480
and other government programs on
our domestic wheat "problem"how important is such foreign aid
to friendly and developing nations?
How valuable are these programs
to U.S. foreign policy?
Should we maintain these programs of assistance? Increase or
decrease them?
The capacity of less developed
nations to import U.S. wheat is
often limited by one or a combination of the following:
I. Inadequate purchasing power.
2. Dietary preferences for white
wheat or rice.
3. Inadequate transportation and
storage facilities.

4. Fear of the effect of imports
on domestic grain production.
5. Reluctance to become dependent upon U.S. wheat without long
term commitments from the U.S.
6. Our interest in promoting
economic development and independence in some importing countries as opposed to having them
become dependent on U.S. exports.
Our capacity to export wheat is
limited by one or more of the following:
I. Reluctance of U.S. taxpayer to
subsidize either the importing country or our domestic wheat industry.
2. Concern over relations with
other exporting countries.
3. A grading system w h i c h
doesn't always adequately describe
milling and baking characteristics.
4. Transportation costs which
give some other countries a competitive advantage.
5. Bilateral trading agreements
between other nations which block
U.S. entry into some markets.
Despite these limitations, we
have exported more wheat than we
have used domestically since 1960.
What have been the key factors
in promoting relatively large U.S.
wheat exports? Who has benefited?
The world wheat export prices
have recently ranged between $1.15
to $1.55 on the farm. Would prices
in this range enable U.S. wheat
growers to produce for export at
a profit?
What limitations are placed on
"free" foreign wheat trade? What
can or should we do about them?
What modifications are advisable
and practicable in U.S. wheat exporting policies, the International
Wheat Agreement, etc., to insure
continued high-or increased-exports?

MARKETING ALTERNATIVES
OR ADJUSTMENTS
How much wheat finds its way
into both domestic and foreign use
is partially dependent on the effectiveness of our marketing efforts.
Thus, no look at alternatives would
be complete without an inspection
of some of the ways people have
suggested the market system could
be improved. Since most of these
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alternatives have been discussed in
Fact Sheet II they will not be r epeated here.
One aspect of marketing, pricing policy, merits more treatment
here. We have already talked about
high and low prices for wheat, so
let us turn to a kind of in-between,
multiple pricing.
Multiple Pricing Systems: Multiple pricing systems for wheat according to end use, similar to the
pricing of milk, have been proposed. In part, wheat is priced
under such a system now that export prices are lower than domestic wheat prices. Multiple pricing
proposals would systematize the
price differences among the various
uses for wheat.
It would be difficult to maintain
separate stocks of the same type of
wheat for different uses. It would,
for example, be difficult to prevent
a buyer of low-priced feed or industrial use wheat from reselling the
wheat for higher priced food uses.
Multiple pricing would require
that differential prices be established by mutual consent or law
and maintained by strict controls.
Without rigid controls, higher
prices would tend to fall toward
the lower levels.
Prices of wheat for feed use
would have to be competitive with
prices of feed grains. If corn sold
at $1.20 per bushel, wheat would
be priced between $1.08 and $1.35,
depending on the class of livestock.
Wheat could be fed to cattle or
hogs at the higher range, and to
lambs at the lower range.
Prices of wheat for industrial
uses would have to be even lower
than feed use prices if wheat were
to be competitive as an industrial
raw material.
Prices of wheat for domestic food
uses could be set at relatively high
levels. This would require an important policy decision, whether or
not to continue favored treatment
of wheat for food. We don't favor
corn going into cornflakes, but do
favor milk for fluid consumption
as compared with "manufacturing"
milk.
Prices for commercial wheat exports would probably be near
"world" or International Wheat

Agreement price levels. Diverting
more whea t to export, industrial or
feed uses would lessen surplus
pressure and would reduce storage
costs.
Multiple pricing attempts to
raise farm income by taking advantage of the different demand elasticities for wheat in various uses.
(See Fact Sheet II). The income
transfer would be made through
the market rather than by government.
How best could a multiple pricing system be operated?
Do any of these domestic use ex. pansion programs offer much hope
for increasing use of wheat or improving prices or net incomes
of wheat growers? What would be
the effect on other segments of our
economy?

THE OUTLOOK FOR WHEAT,
PEOPLE AND THE PLAINS
Changes in wheat production,
transportation, storage and marketing methods can be expected. Vertical and horizontal coordination,
government programs, contract arrangements and direct buying, rail
rates, highway systems, overseas
outlets, methods of storage, and
utilization research-all these things
will affect the flow of wheat
through marketing channels in the
future.
Improvement in any aspect of
wheat commerce will help. Combi-

n ations of improvements will h elp
more. Improvements will take time.
They will take concerted efforts. All
problems will not Qe solved at once.

Which Way Now?
If nothing else were affected, it
would be-at least in the short run
-to the advantage of the Plains and
her people to grow and export as
much wheat as possible. But other
producers, other regions and other
nations are affected.
The d ecision on how much to
grow and export, how high th e
price should be, and many other
questions involve national and international policy considerations.
Basically the choices we face are
to (1) increase domestic uses and
exports or (2) reduce production.
Either could produce benefits; both
would involve costs.
Which way and how far do we
go?
This our nation-through the
democratic process-must answer.
Even so, governmental action alone
can't solve all the problems or implement all the needed changes.
What can and should you-the
producer, the Main Street businessman, the professional man, the
technician, the artisan, the laborer,
the ·· machinery ge<;tler, the local
government official, the elevator
operator, the grain exporter, the
miller-do to help deveJop a better
future for the Plains and her
people?
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